In the third week of April, the US allowed some transactions related to Russian crude oil sales for one more month. Ukraine strongly criticized this decision, saying it keeps Russia's war money flowing. President Zelensky also openly showed his frustration. Because the West did not move more strongly, Ukraine went further and directly attacked Russian refining facilities. The goal is to shake both the money Russia earns from selling oil and its military fuel supply. The US worries about instability in the energy market, and Ukraine thinks cutting off war funding is more urgent. This conflict is not only a problem between Ukraine and Russia. If Russian oil supply becomes unstable, global oil prices can rise, and then importing countries like Korea are also affected right away. So this news is war news, but at the same time it is also energy and inflation news.
원문 보기It looks like a contradiction, but actually it was the same calculation
That is exactly why this news feels confusing. The US says it is sanctioning Russia, but it still gave 30 more days to wrap up some transactions related to crude oil sales, and Ukraine saw that and got angry, saying, 'Why are they opening Russia's war money line even more right now?'
But the US was not looking only at justice in war. If Russian crude oil suddenly disappears from the market in a big way, global oil prices can jump, and that shock can spread not only to Europe but also to prices in importing countries like Korea and Japan. So the US has been doing a very uncomfortable balancing act of cutting Russia's profits, but not fully stopping supply to the world market.
On the other hand, time moves differently for Ukraine. Sanctions take a long time to be announced, enforced, and show results, but a drone can fly tonight and burn a refinery by tomorrow morning. So this moment is closer to a head-on clash between the logic of market stability and the logic of a country fighting in war than a story of 'the US is indecisive.'
The US wanted to avoid a spike in oil prices, and Ukraine wanted to cut Russia's money line faster.
Even with the same sanctions on Russia, the 'global market' and the 'war front' gave different answers.
Two things the US tried to protect at the same time
| Item | Pressure on Russia's profits | Stability in the global energy market |
|---|---|---|
| Main goal | Reduce the money Russia can earn for war | Prevent a sharp rise in global oil prices and supply shocks |
| Main tools | Sanctions, price cap system, finance and insurance limits | General license, temporary handling of cargo already shipped |
| Why make an exception | Keep the effect, but raise the cost of going around it | To avoid confusion where shipping, insurance, and payment all stop at once |
| Expected effect | Lower profitability of Russian exports | Keep market supply, prevent a sharp oil price jump |
| Problem seen by Ukraine | The pressure is not enough | In the end, it looks like a step that gives Russia more time |
Why did they give 30 more days right now
When the market mood is already shaking, if they tighten Russian supply too fast, oil prices can jump even more.
For Russia, oil is not just an export product, it is a cash window for war
You might think, 'Why are we watching Russian oil so closely?' The reason is simple. Oil and gas support about 30% of Russia's federal budget. That means almost one third of the country's budget comes from here, so this money is not just company sales. It is also state operating money and war money.
In fact, Russia earned about 847 hundred million euro from fossil fuel exports by February 2025 after the full-scale invasion, and in the third year of the invasion alone, it earned 242 hundred million euro. Most of that was crude oil and petroleum products. Simply put, the heart of Russia's war economy is still beating through energy exports.
Of course, sanctions are not completely useless. Income went down, and discount sales increased too. But the key point is that 'making it earn less' and 'making it unable to earn' are different. So far, sanctions have hurt Russia, but they are closer to the view that they have not completely cut off the cash flow enough to stop the war.
Russia is moving into a wartime economy with a much bigger defense budget, so cash needs to keep flowing.
If oil income shakes, the budget, ruble defense, and weapons production all get pressure at the same time.
Most of Russia's fossil fuel money ends up coming from oil
Why is oil money such a painful weak point
| Indicator | Figure | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Fossil fuel revenue in the 3rd year of the invasion | 242 hundred million euros | It means energy cash flow is still huge even if the war gets longer |
| Of that, crude oil + petroleum products | 179 hundred million euros | It means most fossil fuel money comes from oil-related products |
| Share of oil and gas in the federal budget | about 30% | It means one third of the country's budget depends on energy tax revenue |
| 2025 defense budget plan | 13.5 trillion rubles | It means a huge amount of money is still needed to keep the wartime economy going |
| Shadow fleet contribution | about one third of annual revenue | It means bypass infrastructure that helps keep selling oil while avoiding sanctions is key |
Ukraine targets refineries to cut the 'middle link,' not just take out one tank
A refinery is not an oil field. It is not a place that pulls crude oil out of the ground, but a factory that turns that crude oil into real fuels like diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel. So if this place gets hit, Russia's military fuel supply and petroleum product exports can both be shaken at the same time. To make it simple, it feels less like breaking the printer that prints money and more like hitting the last exchange office before the money goes out to the market.
But this is not a magic fix either. There was an estimate that the 2024 attacks at one point disrupted about 17~20% of Russia's oil refining capacity, but the actual drop in production was mostly smaller, around 3~6%. That is because Russia absorbed the shock by running other facilities, rerouting, and repairing.
Still, there is a reason Ukraine keeps using this strategy. To protect the oil refineries, Russia has to spread its air defense network widely, and it also has to keep sending repair workers and parts. So attacks on oil facilities are not really a decisive blow that changes the front line overnight, but are closer to a pressure card for a long war of attrition that keeps building costs and anxiety in the rear.
A 20% disruption in refining capacity does not directly mean a 20% drop in production.
But if bottlenecks appear in refining, storage, and transport, the total cost of the war economy keeps rising steadily.
Strikes on oil refining facilities: the felt damage and the actual production drop were different
When you put the numbers side by side, you can see why this strategy is neither 'no effect' nor a 'decisive blow.'
How did Ukraine's strategy move from 'asking for sanctions' to 'direct strikes'?
As the war dragged on, it becomes clearer in time order what Ukraine came to believe.
Stage 1: In 2022, survival and Western support came first
Right after the full-scale invasion, Ukraine's top priority was defending the capital and surviving. At that time, there was very strong hope that Western sanctions and weapons support would change the course of the war.
Stage 2: In the second half of 2022, sanctions alone did not stop the air strikes
Western sanctions grew stronger, but Russia kept up drone and missile production. Ukraine started to feel the reality that 'sanctions are slow, and the air strikes still come today.'
Stage 3: In 2023, it started sending the war back into Russia's rear area
Events like the drone attack on Moscow were a symbolic turning point. They sent the message that mainland Russia was no longer a completely safe rear area.
Stage 4: In 2024, oil refining facilities became a key target
Ukraine repeatedly targeted oil refining facilities and energy infrastructure to directly shake Russia's war fuel and export revenue base. In other words, it started carrying out its own 'long-range sanctions by drone.'
Stage 5: In 2024~2025, drones became not just a tactic but an industry
While facing limits on the use of Western weapons and delays in supply, Ukraine expanded production of its own long-range drones. Cheap and quick to scale up, drones became an asymmetric weapon for the weaker side, a way to keep bothering a bigger enemy at low cost.
What is different between Western sanctions and Ukraine's drone attacks?
| Comparison item | Western sanctions | Ukraine's direct drone attacks |
|---|---|---|
| Speed of effect appearing | Slow. It builds up through finance, trade, and industry. | Fast. Right after the strike, facility damage and psychological effects appear. |
| Possibility of bypassing | High. There are shadow fleets, non-Western insurance, and third-country trade. | A complete bypass is difficult. A hit facility immediately needs recovery and defense costs. |
| Political limits | Agreement between allies and adjustment of exceptions are needed. | If they are its own drones, it has relatively more freedom to act. |
| Market impact | Depending on the design, it tries to reduce the oil price shock. | If strikes on refineries grow, oil price instability could instead get bigger. |
| Reliability felt by Ukraine | A needed but frustrating tool | Even if imperfect, a tool that can be used right away |
Why this can shake even Korea is because the energy market connects before borders do.
Russia is still a big supplier in the global energy market even under sanctions. It accounted for about 11% of global crude oil exports, and in 2023 its total oil exports were estimated at about 750ten thousand barrels per day. So when news comes out that Russian refineries were hit, that sanctions were tightened, or that exceptions were extended, the market first calculates, 'Will supply be shaken?'
The problem does not end here. If energy prices move, shipping costs, insurance fees, manufacturing costs, heating bills, and even jet fuel prices move too. Europe was hit hard first because before the war it had high dependence on Russian gas and crude oil, and countries like Korea that import most of their crude oil also end up feeling a similar impact. Even if the battlefield is far away, gas station price boards and electricity bills connect faster than you might think.
That is why the US sanctions Russia while still being careful about supply shocks. And that is also how we can understand why Ukraine, even while feeling frustrated, directly strikes refineries. One side thinks, 'The whole world should not be shaken together,' and the other side thinks, 'Still, Russia's money flow must be cut quickly.' In the end, this news is best understood as a scene where the morality of war and the reality of the global economy collide.
If international oil prices rise, the burden of import prices, logistics costs, air tickets, and heating bills can grow.
Even if war news feels far away, it can easily become cost-of-living news through the energy market.
Why the world gets sensitive when Russian energy is shaken
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