Theborn Korea recorded a big drop in performance last year. On a consolidated basis, sales were 361.2 hundred million KRW, down 22.2% from a year earlier, and operating profit turned into a deficit with a loss of 23.7 hundred million KRW. The company runs many restaurant brands like Paik's Coffee, Hong Kong Banjeom 0410, and Saemaeul Restaurant. Last year, many brands showed falling sales together. Analysis said that to recover performance, it needs more efficient production structure and stronger brand competitiveness. In the article, especially the performance of the Paik's Coffee business division was mentioned as the key variable for recovery, and people also noticed that CEO Baek Jong-won received pay at the same level as the previous year even during worsening performance.
원문 보기A 23.7 hundred million KRW deficit, but this is not just a simple downturn story
If you only look at the numbers, it is easy to just think, 'These days the restaurant business is hard,' and move on. But for Theborn Korea, it is a little different. On top of the outside shock of the restaurant market slowdown, store owner conflicts, reputation issues, and higher expectations after listing all came together at once.
Simply put, it was like having a weak umbrella on a rainy day. The economy getting worse means everyone got rained on, but some companies hold up and some get much wetter. Even in the same restaurant downturn, Theborn Korea had big differences in results by brand, and especially brands like Yeondon Bolkatsu, where disputes became a symbol, were hit more clearly.
What is important here is that this cannot be explained only by saying 'it is because of the restaurant market.' Some brands like Paik's Coffee still expanded, while others shrank. Then the question changes. Could the way the company used to do well have now become a weakness instead?
Not only the industry downturn, but also reputation risk and operating gaps worked together.
The fact that results were split by brand even inside the same company shows a structural problem.
Why did it shake — the shock from outside and the problems that grew inside were different
| Category | What happened | Why was it important |
|---|---|---|
| Industry factor | Sales pressure grew overall because of slower spending and a weak restaurant market. | This is the basic background that all restaurant brands faced similar headwinds. |
| Conflict with store owners | In cases like Yeondon Bolkatsu, complaints grew about store profitability and support from headquarters. | For franchise companies, if store owner trust shakes, both new store openings and existing store operations get weaker together. |
| Reputation risk | Controversies kept piling up one after another about country of origin, labeling and advertising, cooking tools, and factory operation. | More than one mistake, the feeling of 'Again?' is even more damaging. |
| Collapse of expectations after listing | At the time of listing, the story of multi-brand growth was strong, but afterward performance and stock price did not keep up with expectations. | Investors saw it like a growth stock, but if the actual numbers shake, disappointment gets bigger. |
| Differences by brand | Paik's Coffee increased, but Yeondon Bolkatsu and some meal brands became weaker. | Even in the same downturn, different results show the difference in operating ability in the end. |
Even inside the same company, their strength was different — changes in store numbers by brand
If you look at the size of the increase and decrease, you can get a sense of which brand was a support and which brand was a wound.
How did Theborn Korea grow — the birth and burden of the multi-brand formula
To understand the current crisis, we need to first look at how this company originally grew.
Step 1: 1994, started as a food franchise company
Theborn Korea was founded in 1994. From the beginning, it was not just running one restaurant brand. It was closer to a platform-style company that directly created and grew many dining brands.
Step 2: the 2000s to 2010s, diversified by expanding menus and business areas
It expanded brands in different categories like Chinese food, street bars, udon, and coffee. So even in the same neighborhood, it could target many different spending situations, from lunch and dinner to drinks and coffee.
Step 3: Baek Jong-won recognition became the engine for expansion
Even when a new brand launched, consumers and future store owners recognized it quickly. Usually, franchises spend a lot of money to promote a new signboard, but for Theborn Korea, Baek Jong-won name value reduced much of that cost.
Step 4: 2024 listing, the growth formula was evaluated in the capital market
About 25 operating brands, franchise expansion power, and overseas potential were presented as the growth story. But after the listing, the question grew bigger: 'Is having many brands really only a strength?'
Step 5: 2025~2026, the formula of expansion came back as a burden of management
As the number of brands grew, it became harder to manage store owners, maintain product competitiveness, and control quality gaps between brands. In the past, increasing the number of brands was a symbol of growth, but now which brands to keep and how to save them has become more important.
Why has the formula that used to be a strength now become a burden?
| Item | Why it was strong in the growth period | Why it is a burden now |
|---|---|---|
| Trust transfer | Even when a new brand launched, it quickly gained recognition thanks to Baek Jong-won's name. | If the founder's reputation shakes, many brands get hit at the same time. |
| Operating system | Sourcing, recipe, and training know-how could be reused across many brands. | As the number of brands grows, quality gaps and management complexity increase. |
| Business area strategy | By dividing menus and price ranges, it could attract many types of customers. | If competition gets stronger by category, weak brands are pushed out first right away. |
| Franchise expansion | The more brands there were, the more chances there were to open stores. | If expanding store numbers does not directly lead to profit at existing stores, complaints build up. |
| Owner-centered promotion | It was good for reducing ad costs and increasing buzz. | The more it depends on a person brand, the harder it is to separate it from corporate governance. |
Brand competitiveness in the dining-out business is closer to 'the power that makes people come back' than name value
In the dining-out business, brand competitiveness does not just mean 'is it famous?' It needs both the power to make customers come in once and the power to make them come back. So the menu, price, operations, and headquarters support need to fit together like one promise.
For example, even if the menu is good, if the taste is inconsistent at each store, people do not go back. Even if the price is cheap, if the wait is too long or the service is unstable, the value-for-money feeling breaks. On the other hand, even if there are many stores, if sales at existing stores are weak, it may just look big on the outside.
If we compare this to life in Korea, it is like this. Even if there are ten chain stores near your home, the place you go back to is the place where the taste is predictable, the price feels fair, and ordering is easy, right? In the end, a dining brand's results come from those repeat visits. So, more important than name value is consistency in operations.
The number of stores is the outside shape, and existing-store sales are the real strength.
Meal brands are more sensitive than coffee brands because the burden of cooking and staffing is bigger.
Menu, price, operations, number of stores: which one shakes results the most?
| Factor | Effect when it goes well | Problem when it gets weak |
|---|---|---|
| Menu · Quality | Repeat visits increase, and existing-store sales become stable. | If people feel disappointed once, they can easily switch to a competing brand right away. |
| Price | If people feel it is good value for money, it keeps customers even during an economic slowdown. | If ingredient cost pressure is high and prices cannot go up, profitability breaks down. |
| Store Operations | If taste, service, and waiting time are consistent, people trust the brand. | If the gap between stores gets too big, the headquarters name value can actually make disappointment bigger. |
| Number of Franchise Stores | Total system sales grow, and market presence becomes bigger. | If existing stores are weak but only new openings increase, owner complaints and store closure risk grow. |
Is the key to recovery Paik's Coffee? — Looking at the numbers, it really is a core pillar
Paik's Coffee is still the strongest support inside The Born Korea.
Where is Paik's Coffee standing in the low-price coffee market?
| Brand | Current position | Strengths and limits |
|---|---|---|
| Mega MGC Coffee | It looks like a top player in number of stores, app usage scale, and payment amount. | Large sizes and aggressive store openings are strengths, but if the market overheats, the burden of protecting profitability grows. |
| Compose Coffee | It has become a large-scale value-for-money brand. | Accessibility and stability are strengths, but its differentiation message may be a little weak. |
| Paik's Coffee | It is a strong top-tier player, but not the absolute number 1. | Value for money + expansion of snacks and non-coffee menu + Baek Jong-won IP are strengths. But it has a big task: it must protect profitability while also keeping its low-price identity. |
In the end, Theborn Korea has a structure that depends a lot on 'Baek Jong-won and the franchise business'.
How did Baek Jong-won become the face of the company, and why does it shake more in a crisis?
There is a reason why it is hard to understand this company without the name Baek Jong-won.
Step 1: The founder and company name were connected from the beginning
Theborn Korea grew under CEO Baek Jong-won's system from the start in 1994. So the personal brand and the company brand grew almost at the same time.
Step 2: Broadcasting activities reduced the company's promotion costs
Baek Jong-won went beyond being a food service CEO and also got the image of a broadcaster and writer. Because of that, when introducing a new brand, he could get big attention with much lower cost than a normal company.
Step 3: In the listing stage, the personal brand also pushed the investment story
Even at the IPO, Baek Jong-won's recognition led not only to consumer interest but also to investor interest. Simply put, not only the company numbers but also trust in the person worked like part of the company value.
Step 4: But in a crisis, the same connection works in the opposite direction
If there is conflict with store owners or a reputation controversy, it spreads right away not as an individual brand problem but as a 'Baek Jong-won brand' problem. Then consumers, store owners, and investors can all be shaken at the same time.
Step 5: So what is needed now is a system, not just name value
A personal brand can make the start faster, but what helps a company last long is the operating system in the end. If Theborn Korea wants to be judged well again, it has to show that Baek Jong-won's personal trust can turn into company operating ability.
If the CEO pay stays the same even in a loss, who will see it differently and how?
| Group | How will they take it | Why is it sensitive? |
|---|---|---|
| Shareholders | If results got worse but pay stays the same, they may think governance is weak. | That is because for a listed company, the link between performance and pay is a basic signal of trust. |
| Institutional investors | They see executive pay as a target for independent monitoring. | After the stewardship code, the pay system became a voting rights issue. |
| Franchise store owners | They may feel left out and think maybe headquarters is fine but only the stores are struggling. | In the franchise business, relationship trust is more important than numbers. |
| Employees | They may see it as a signal of whether the whole company is tightening spending or not. | In a loss period, they watch carefully whether management shares responsibility first. |
| Media and public opinion | They take it as a symbolic scene of 'results were bad, but pay stayed the same.' | That is because it is easier to show the responsibility issue with one scene than with a complicated business explanation. |
So The Born Korea's real homework is not 'the name Baek Jong-won' but 'brand operating power'
This deficit looks less like a one-year mistake and more like a sign that the old growth formula works less well in today's market. The strategy of adding many brands and growing fast with the founder's name was clearly strong. But now, with stronger competition and more careful spending, the power to keep operating quality steady across the board has become more important.
Paik's Coffee can clearly become a stepping stone for recovery. The number of stores is growing, and its presence is big. But even if Paik's Coffee does well alone, it is hard for the whole company to get a high evaluation again. From an investor's view, it may look like a 'one-brand dependent company,' and from a store owner's view, fixing the problems of the other brands may feel more urgent.
In the end, for The Born Korea to win trust again, it needs to show two things. First, it must build an operating structure that franchise stores can really survive with. Second, it must create a system where each brand stays competitive even without Baek Jong-won's personal brand. In the next report card, what the market wants to see will be less shaky operations rather than fancy slogans.
The heart of this crisis is closer to structural weakness rather than the recession itself.
The key to recovery is not expanding Paik's Coffee, but restoring each brand's operating power and rebuilding trust.
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