As the confrontation between the US and Iran grew, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was heavily shaken. At the time of the article, 26 out of about 40 Korea-related ships were staying inside or near the strait, waiting to pass through. Shipping companies were pulling back for a while to safer waters and waiting. On the other hand, some Japan-related ships got out, so the difference looked even bigger. The Japanese government said it did not pay passage fees, and only explained that there had been a diplomatic result. The Iranian Embassy in Japan mentioned the friendly relationship between the two countries, including the 1953 Nisshomaru incident. The Korean government also sent a special envoy to Iran and continued high-level contact. But there is still no clear result. The article presented these background factors that made the Korean ship problem harder: stronger US sanctions on Iran, conflict over frozen funds between Korea and Iran, and the strait's double blockade situation.
원문 보기
When 26 ships stopped, it does not mean only the ships cannot move
If you only look at the article, it may seem like simple news that 26 Korean ships are stuck. But this number is closer to a signal showing how deeply Korea is connected to the global energy chokepoint called the Strait of Hormuz. If you understand this, you can see why both the foreign ministry and industry are nervous at the same time.
The Strait of Hormuz is almost the only exit from the Persian Gulf to the outer sea. As of 2024~2025, about 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through here every day, and about 20% of global LNG trade also went through this route. The strait itself is about 29 nautical miles at its narrowest point, but the actual shipping lanes are much narrower, around 2 nautical miles for entry and 2 nautical miles for departure. It is not like a big highway. It is closer to a narrow tollgate where huge oil tankers and gas carriers line up to pass.
Korea has low energy self-sufficiency and high dependence on Middle East crude oil and gas, so it is especially sensitive to this kind of chokepoint. So even if ship delays do not immediately raise gas station prices, freight rates, war insurance premiums, and spot energy prices move first. If you understand this much, you can read this news as not just shipping news, but also energy security and inflation news.
The Hormuz problem should be read not as 'ships were blocked' but as 'the energy chokepoint was shaken.'
If you keep this view, you can connect oil prices, insurance premiums, and diplomatic negotiation news in the later article in one line.
What percentage of global energy does the Strait of Hormuz hold?
First, look at the numbers to see why one small strait shakes the global market.
When the strait is shaken, it spreads to the Korean economy in this order
Even before a real supply shortage comes, prices and costs move first.
Step 1: Ships wait or turn back
In disputed waters, ships often do not enter right away and wait in safe seas. At this stage, goods are not completely cut off yet, but the schedule starts to get delayed.
Step 2: Insurance premiums and freight rates jump first
War risk insurance premiums react fastest to danger signals. If insurance gets expensive or coverage is refused, shipping companies and cargo owners have to recalculate the voyage itself.
Step 3: International oil prices and LNG spot prices become unstable
In the market, prices go up even just from the expectation that there may be a shortage later, not only from a real shortage. If you know this, it becomes easier to understand why price news comes out before cargo disruption news.
Step 4: Costs rise for the refining, power generation, and petrochemical industries
Industries that use a lot of crude oil and gas feel cost pressure first. This is why news about company earnings and production costs comes after that.
Step 5: In the end, it leads to pressure on prices and public utility fees
When fuel costs and power generation costs go up, transportation, electricity, gas, and daily prices slowly come under pressure. So even if strait news feels far away, it is connected to our daily lives.
The phrase 'double blockade' in the article is short, but the real meaning is quite complex
The double blockade in the article does not mean putting chains across the sea to block the way. Usually, it means a state where direct maritime control and indirect sailing paralysis happen at the same time. Warships, aircraft, and surveillance systems identify approaching ships, warn them, and give orders to stop, while in the private market, insurance and contracts freeze up, so ships become unable to enter on their own.
Many people also ask why ships cannot just go around, but a chokepoint like Hormuz is literally a narrow bottleneck route. Most crude oil and LNG from the Gulf region have to pass through this exit, so there are almost no side routes. To use another route, they have to use land pipelines or a long detour sea route, but it is hard to replace it right away in terms of volume and cost.
The important point here is that the market does not need a blockade to be 100% perfect to get shocked. Even if only a few ships turn back and only a few ships wait, the risk calculation changes for ship owners and cargo owners. If you understand this, you can see why the market shakes first even without extreme expressions like 'complete suspension of passage'.
Direct blockade = force that stops movement by military action
Indirect blockade = a state where movement becomes commercially impossible because of insurance, contracts, and costs
What is different between direct blockade and indirect blockade?
| Category | Direct blockade | Indirect blockade |
|---|---|---|
| Who makes it work | Warships, aircraft, surveillance systems | Insurance companies, banks, shipping companies, cargo owners |
| Main methods | Warnings, orders to stop, inspections, orders to turn back | Refusal of insurance coverage, sharp rise in freight rates, contract suspension |
| Risks felt by ships | Seizure, collision, mines, armed threats | Bigger losses, trouble entering port, unable to make payment |
| Speed of market impact | Immediate, but it may be selective | Wide and spreads fast |
| Key understanding | The force that physically stops a ship | The force that makes a ship unable to move commercially |
Why some Japanese ships pass but Korean ships get tied up cannot be explained in one line
| Item | Japan | Korea |
|---|---|---|
| Ship classification method | Uses the concept of Japan-related ships more broadly than just Japanese-flagged ships | Nationality, ownership, and operation structures are tangled, so individual negotiations are harder |
| Working-level channels | Besides government channels, shipping company, cargo owner, and broker channels are also mentioned together | The share of government-centered response is large, and bilateral negotiation options are limited |
| Memory of relations with Iran | Historical stories like the Nisshomaru incident can be used as a symbol of friendship | Frozen funds, ship detention, and conflict over diplomatic remarks have piled up |
| Exposure to US sanctions | The impact is big, but experience with individual review for each ship has built up | Because of the Korea-US alliance and the financial sanctions structure, moves become more careful |
| Key point | Diplomacy + private-sector practice + historical assets work together | Diplomacy + sanctions limits + accumulated distrust overlap |
Why does Japan move by the concept of ‘related vessels’ rather than ‘national-flag ships’?
If you look at the structure of Japan's merchant fleet, it becomes easier to understand why individual review by vessel and the concept of ‘related vessels’ are discussed as important.
Why is the 1953 Nisshomaru incident still brought up again now?
If you know this incident, you can see what role the ‘historical narrative’ plays in Japan-Iran relations.
Step 1: In 1951, Iran nationalized the oil industry
When the Mossadegh government declared the nationalization of the oil industry, it clashed with the British-centered order. This conflict became the starting point of the Nisshomaru incident.
Step 2: Because of the British blockade, Iran looked for new buyers
Iranian oil became hard to sell, and Japan, which urgently needed postwar industrial rebuilding, really needed to secure cheap crude oil. Their interests matched.
Step 3: In 1953, the Nisshomaru carried crude oil under tension
The Japanese tanker Nisshomaru loaded crude oil in Abadan and departed, passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The reason it is still talked about is that strait passage, sanctions evasion, and energy supply all overlap in one scene.
Step 4: This incident became a symbol of Japan-Iran friendship
On the Iranian side, it remained as the memory that ‘Japan reached out in a difficult time,’ and on the Japanese side, it remained as a symbol of securing energy during the postwar economic rebuilding period.
Step 5: The 1957 friendship treaty, and being called up again in the 2020s
After that, the relationship was institutionalized through the friendship treaty, and even now, whenever Middle East tensions or a Hormuz crisis happens, this incident is brought up again. Still, this is not a master key, and it is closer to a symbolic asset that creates a friendly mood in negotiations.
Why the results were limited even though Korea sent a special envoy
If you look at this part too simply as ‘because Korean diplomacy is weak,’ it is actually easy to miss the structure. The biggest constraint when Korea negotiates with Iran is the sanctions system against Iran under the Korea-US alliance. Even if Korea wants to, it is not a structure where it can independently loosen dollar settlement, financial transfers, crude oil trade, or the release of funds.
On top of that, between Korea and Iran, the frozen funds issue has already built up deeply. About 6 billion~7 billion dollars of Iranian funds in Korea were tied up for a long time, and Iran has repeatedly used this as a negotiation card. The 2021 detention of a Korean tanker also increased this distrust even more. So it is more accurate to see this passage issue not as a sudden diplomatic issue, but as an incident riding on top of earlier conflicts.
The diplomatic conflict that arose after President Yoon Suk Yeol's 2023 remark that ‘Iran is the enemy of the UAE’ also made the negotiation environment more sensitive. In the end, Korea's special envoy went to deal with the practical issue of maritime safety, but in reality faced sanctions, finance, and political distrust all at once. If you know this, you can understand why the fact that there were high-level contacts and the result that there were no visible achievements can both be true at the same time.
Even if Korea wants to improve relations with Iran, it is hard to use the cards of finance and crude oil trade separately from US sanctions.
So sending a special envoy is important, but if the higher-level structure is not resolved, the results can only be limited.
How did Korea-Iran relations get tangled up this far?
The reason negotiations are hard now is not a problem of just a day or two, but because incidents that built up over several years are connected.
2018: The United States restored sanctions on Iran
From this time, Korea's space for financial and oil trade with Iran dropped very fast. After that, the issue between the two countries was basically linked to factors in Korea-US relations.
2019: The freezing of Iranian funds in Korea started in earnest
As several billion dollars were tied up, this became the main conflict in relations between the two countries. It is also the issue that appears most often in negotiations.
2021: The detention of a Korean oil tanker happened
As the financial conflict combined with maritime security issues, the negotiations became much harder. This event showed that sea issues and money issues do not move separately.
2023: Talks on partly releasing frozen funds overlapped with conflict over diplomatic remarks
There was formal progress, but the sanctions structure itself was not resolved. Also, conflict over political remarks was added, so rebuilding trust did not become easy.
2026: Sending a special envoy during tension in Hormuz
Korea tried to manage ship safety and passage issues, but there is an assessment that the results were limited because the restrictions built up above worked at the same time.
As US sanctions get stronger, where does trade stop first
| Stage | Who checks first | Where does it stop easily |
|---|---|---|
| Ship and cargo inspection | Shipping company, broker, management company | If the ship ownership structure and cargo source are unclear, loading is put on hold |
| Insurance review | Insurance company, P&I club | Operation problems happen because war insurance premiums rise sharply or coverage is refused |
| Port and entry management | Port authority, terminal | Entry is restricted because of risky cargo or worry about sanctions exposure |
| Payment review | Bank, compliance department | Because payment transfer is delayed or refused, the trade itself cannot be completed |
| Contract performance | Cargo owner, charterer | Contract review because of delay losses and sanctions risk |
| Key bottleneck | Insurance companies and banks often move cautiously first | Even if the ships sail, if money does not move, you should see the trade as stopped |
So this news should be read as 'three layers of bottlenecks' rather than '26 ships'
When you get here, the structure of this news becomes a little clearer. First, it is a geographic bottleneck. The Strait of Hormuz is very narrow and alternative routes are limited, so if only a few ships stop, the global energy market gets nervous first.
Second, it is a diplomatic bottleneck. Japan had room to use both its historical relationship and private working-level channels, but Korea had less room to move because of frozen funds, piled-up conflict, and the limits of the Korea-US alliance. So even in the same strait, the speed of negotiations and the results can be different.
Third, it is a sanctions and financial bottleneck. It may look like a military issue whether ships can pass or not, but in reality, insurance, payments, and contracts all need to move together to solve it. If you understand this, when similar news comes out next time, you should not only look at 'how many ships are stuck,' but also watch whether oil prices go up, whether insurance premiums jump, whether US sanctions become stronger, and whether political signals come out between Korea and Iran. That is exactly the way to read this news properly.
1) Strait traffic volume and number of waiting ships
2) Movement of war risk insurance premiums, freight rates, and oil prices
3) Whether US sanctions are strengthened and Korea-Iran diplomatic signals
We will tell you how to live in Korea
Please give lots of love to gltr life