The CU logistics conflict is not simply about delivery drivers asking for higher pay, but has grown into a dispute over a multi-level contract structure and the scope of responsibility. The drivers said BGF Retail is the real main contractor and asked for direct negotiations. The company says it is not a direct party because the logistics subsidiary and transport company are separate. Yonhap News reported that CU has a more complicated structure that goes from headquarters to a logistics subsidiary, regional logistics centers and transport companies, and then delivery drivers. GS25 and Seven Eleven were compared as having a relatively simpler contract structure with one less step. Because of this difference, it becomes more unclear who sets the unit price and who should take responsibility. As the conflict went on longer, it was reported that about 3 thousand stores nationwide were affected at one point. Store owners worry about empty shelves and lower sales, and headquarters cannot easily raise logistics costs because of low operating profit margins. In the end, this crisis became a case that asks again about main contractor responsibility and supply chain structure in Korea's retail industry.
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Why is this called a 'structure dispute' and not a 'wage dispute'?
On the outside, it may look like just 'delivery drivers fighting because they want more money'. But when you look inside, the story is much more complicated. What the drivers are raising is not just one total monthly pay amount. It includes delivery unit price, the number of runs per day, who really decides dispatching, and who they need to negotiate with to make change happen all together.
In this structure, it does not end just by raising one number on the unit price table. If the number of runs goes down, the drivers' income is cut right away, and if the number of runs goes up, working hours and work intensity can rise sharply. The actual contract is between the transport company and the drivers, but if the systems and standards at the upper level control the work in the field, then from the drivers' view, 'the real decision maker is someone else, so why do we have to talk only with the middle step?' This complaint naturally comes up.
Also, convenience store logistics does not stop only inside a factory when there is a strike. The logistics center, stores, store owners, and consumers are all shaken one after another. So this conflict is read less as wage bargaining and more as a dispute asking how the whole supply chain works and where responsibility lies inside that structure.
Unit price and number of runs are directly connected to drivers' income.
But if it is unclear who really sets those standards, the conflict grows into a structural problem.
Why does one line about unit price spread into empty store shelves?
A convenience store logistics conflict starts at one point and quickly spreads into a problem that consumers can feel.
Step 1: unit price and number of runs change
If the delivery unit price is low or the number of runs decreases, drivers' income goes down. On the other hand, if the number of runs increases, they have to work longer and under tighter pressure.
Step 2: drivers look for the biggest decision maker
Even if the formal contract side is the transport company, if drivers feel the upper level controls dispatching and standards, they end up asking to talk directly with the main contractor.
Step 3: if negotiations get blocked, delivery problems happen
If the conflict spreads into a strike or problems with vehicle departures, logistics center operations are shaken, and store supply is delayed right away.
Step 4: store owners and consumers get hit first
Convenience stores do not keep a large extra stock, so empty shelves show up right away. Store owners receive customer complaints, and consumers cannot buy the products they need.
Step 5: In the end, it turns into a fight over 'who is responsible'
At this point, the issue moves away from wages and shifts to supply chain control and main contractor responsibility. That is why people call it a structural dispute.
Who holds what, and where conflict can happen
| Stage | Main role | Conflict point |
|---|---|---|
| BGF Retail | Runs the convenience store business, makes final orders and business policy decisions | The union sees it as the real main contractor and asks for bargaining |
| BGF Logis | Logistics subsidiary, manages logistics operations | The company side separates the logistics responsible party as the subsidiary |
| Regional logistics centers and transport companies | On-site dispatching, route operation, driver contracts | Formally, they are the direct contracting party, so the negotiation window gets narrowed here |
| Delivery drivers | Actually deliver products to stores | Directly carry the burden of unit price, number of runs, and vehicle maintenance costs |
| Franchise store owners | Run stores and respond to customers | When delivery is disrupted, they are the first to feel empty shelves and lower sales |
What is different about the 'main contractor responsibility' the Cargo Truckers Solidarity talks about
The 'main contractor responsibility' here does not just mean the top company should take moral responsibility. In law and in the workplace, who actually controls and decides working conditions is more important. Even if the name is not on the contract, if it has big influence over the rate structure, work methods, and whether replacement transport happens, the logic becomes 'you also have responsibility.'
This is also why the Cargo Truckers Solidarity calls BGF Retail the direct bargaining partner. They think it is hard to change the whole structure by talking only to the middle transport companies. On the other hand, BGF Retail keeps its distance, saying the logistics subsidiary and transport companies are separate and it is not the party that signed the direct contract. So the key point of this fight is not 'who will pay more money' but 'who is the real decision maker'.
This debate is sensitive because it can become a precedent. If the bargaining responsibility of the main contractor is strongly recognized this time, the same question will likely continue in other industries too, not only convenience stores but also parcel delivery, manufacturing subcontracting, and outsourced logistics.
It means looking not at the boss named on the contract, but at the side that really affects the conditions of the work.
Recently, the debate is moving toward looking at the real substance, not the form.
Where are the Cargo Truckers Solidarity Union and BGF Retail clashing?
| Issue | Cargo Truckers Solidarity Union view | BGF Retail view |
|---|---|---|
| Standard for responsibility | Real control and final decision-making power are important | A direct contract relationship comes first |
| Bargaining counterpart | The main contractor must come out directly for the structure to change | It should be handled at the subsidiary or transport company level |
| Interpretation of the logistics structure | A multi-step structure spreads out responsibility | They see the role at each contract stage as clear |
| Cause of the conflict | A structural problem around unit price and number of trips | It includes demands beyond the scope of the direct contract |
| Meaning of this situation | A case testing the responsibility of the main contractor | A dispute over an individual logistics contract |
How did the Yellow Envelope Act get to this point?
This law did not suddenly fall from the sky. It came out after old homework from labor disputes in Korea piled up.
2009: SsangYong Motor strike
After the strike against layoffs, the problem of damages and provisional seizure became a big issue. When workers went on strike, the structure of being pressured by huge claims became a social issue.
2014: Yellow Envelope campaign
After a court ruled 4700M KRW in damages against SsangYong Motor workers, citizens started a campaign to help by collecting small amounts of money. The name 'Yellow Envelope Act' also came from here.
2010s to early 2020s: expansion of the employer status debate
Through the conflicts over Hyundai in-house subcontracting, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering subcontracting, and CJ Logistics parcel delivery, the question of 'who is the real employer?' became bigger.
2022~2025: Legislative clash
The amendment bills for Articles 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Act were proposed, and debates over passage, veto, and re-legislation continued. The key points were limits on damage claims and expanding the scope of employers.
2026: Enforcement, and the CU conflict
As soon as the law took effect, the issue of whether the main contractor is the employer came to the front in the CU logistics conflict. It moved from an abstract debate to a real test in actual industrial sites.
The Yellow Envelope Act tries to change two things
| Part | What it tries to change | How it connects to the CU case |
|---|---|---|
| Limits on damages and provisional seizure | It tries to reduce the weakening of the three basic labor rights by blocking excessive damage claims against workers who join strikes | It connects to the practice of putting too much pressure on union activity when disputes grow bigger |
| Expansion of employer scope | It tries to let subcontracted and specially employed workers bargain with the party that has real decision-making power | This is the key background of the issue of whether BGF Retail is the real employer |
How is CU's four-party structure different from other convenience stores?
| Brand | Typical contract flow | Conflict feature |
|---|---|---|
| CU | BGF Retail → BGF Logis → regional logistics center and transport company → driver | There are more steps between headquarters and the field, so arguments over responsibility become bigger |
| GS25 | GS Retail → GS Networks → transport company → driver | It looks relatively one step simpler |
| 7-Eleven | 7-Eleven → Lotte Global Logistics → carrier → driver | The connection between the logistics company and the carrier is relatively direct |
| Emart24 | Emart24 → specialized logistics company → carrier → driver | Operated mainly with outside logistics companies, without a subsidiary |
It may seem like raising logistics costs will solve it, but convenience stores cannot do that
At this point, you may think like this. 'Why not just raise the logistics cost a little and solve it?' But convenience stores do not work that simply. This business type has a low-margin, high-turnover structure that sells a lot with small margins, so if costs go up even a little, profitability shakes right away.
The problem is that there is not just one side that carries the burden. If headquarters takes all of it, operating profit goes down. If it passes it to store owners, stores already pressed by rent and labor costs may push back. Suppliers already carry the burden of outsourced logistics costs, and if they raise consumer prices right away, they still have to compete closely with other convenience stores, big supermarkets, online shopping, and delivery services.
So in the convenience store industry, instead of raising costs directly all at once, indirect ways often appear, like reducing promotions, adjusting supply terms, or setting separate prices for delivery channels. In the end, this conflict is also connected to the question of 'who will get the final bill.'
If headquarters holds on, profitability is cut. If store owners hold on, complaints in the field grow.
Raising consumer prices is close to the very last card in the highly competitive convenience store business.
The burden of logistics costs has already spread across the chain
The items with exact accounting numbers made public are limited, but even from public data, you can get a sense of where the pressure from logistics costs is hitting.
Who will feel how much pain
| Party | How the burden is carried | Why it is not easy to solve |
|---|---|---|
| Headquarters | Directly absorb the increase in logistics costs | Because of the low-margin structure, absorbing it for a long time hurts profitability |
| Franchise store owner | Increase in fees, operating costs, and on-site losses | Labor and rent costs are already a big burden, so they are sensitive to extra cost pass-through |
| Suppliers | Pressure from outsourced logistics costs and delivery terms | If bargaining power is weak, they are likely to bear the costs |
| Consumers | Smaller promotions, higher felt prices, and double pricing in some channels | If prices go up right away, customers may move to competing stores |
Why do convenience stores get shaken faster than hypermarkets?
| Category | Convenience store | Hypermarket · online |
|---|---|---|
| Inventory buffer | Small. The back room and store space are narrow | Relatively large. There are warehouses and buffer stock |
| Delivery dependence | Small-volume, high-frequency delivery. Cold items are usually delivered 2 times a day | Can be buffered with bulk delivery and stockpiling |
| Out-of-stock visibility | If the shelf is empty, you can see it right away | The store is larger and has more substitute items |
| Consumer demand | Many purchases are for things needed right now | Planned purchases or substitute purchases are relatively possible |
| Store owner feeling | They face customer complaints and falling sales right away | The direct impact tends to be spread out |
So in the end, whose problem is this conflict?
If you follow the CU logistics conflict, it all comes down to one question. It is the question of who should be held responsible when the people who run the site and the people who make decisions about the site are different. If this is not solved, the same kind of conflict is likely to happen again not only in convenience stores, but also in other logistics and subcontracting industries.
Another important point is that the cost of this kind of dispute always falls downward first. Drivers deal with income and workload problems, store owners face empty shelves and lower sales, and consumers feel the inconvenience. The debate about the responsibility of the main contractor may sound like difficult legal language, but actually, it is a story connected even to the moment when I cannot buy just one lunchbox at the neighborhood convenience store.
So if you look at this situation only as a labor-management conflict article about one specific company, you miss half of it. Looking at it more broadly, this shows how the multi-step logistics structure created by Korea's retail industry for efficiency can easily turn into a gap in responsibility during a crisis. When similar news comes out next time, now you will look not only at 'who signed the contract' but also at 'who actually made the decisions'.
An efficient multi-step structure lowers costs in normal times, but when conflict breaks out, it can blur responsibility.
The debate over the responsibility of the main contractor is very likely to spread to other logistics and subcontracting industries in the future.
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